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M .  C a t h l e e n  K a v e n y
hen asked what project I am working on while on leave at the Martin Marty
Center during the 2002–2003 academic year, the short response I usually 
give is “complicity with evil.” That response is perfect for cocktail parties in 
the big city and receptions at large academic conferences. It appears to be 
glamorous, dangerous, sexy—and hopelessly vague. Unfortunately, like many
phenomena at such parties and receptions, the surface impression is actually 
COMPLICITY WITH EVIL
quite deceptive. The issues that I actually deal with are
highly specific, and can range from the riveting and heart-
breaking to the sadly mundane. 
The topic of complicity encompasses the following
dilemma: Should Sophie Zawistowska, the title character in
William Styron’s unforgettable novel Sophie’s Choice, have
accepted the SS physician’s offer to allow her to decide
which of her two young children would live (or at least
have a chance at life) and which would face immediate
death in a Nazi gas chamber? But it also encompasses the
more everyday question: Should you lend your brother five
bucks so that he can buy the cigarettes that you both know
will kill him one day? While some questions of complicity
have to do with sex, very few are actually sexy. For exam-
ple, a fair amount of ink has been spilt in analyzing (in Latin
as well as in English) whether or not a taxi driver ought 
to drive a customer to an address he knows to be a house of
ill repute. 
Braced by the cold clarity of a winter day in Hyde Park,
I might offer the following, more theoretical elaboration of
the problem of complicity: Suppose an agent is contem-
plating performing an action that will either contribute to
or in some sense make use of the wrongful action of another
agent or group of agents. How should one morally evaluate
her contemplated action in light of its connection with the
wrongful action of another? What considerations should be
involved in her decision whether or not to go ahead with
her action?
The more theoretical elaboration of the problem reveals
a structural similarity between the two concrete dilemmas
described above. As different as they are in terms of moral
seriousness and historical moment, both involve an individual
who must make a decision whether to contribute to the
wrongful act of another agent. But there are also cases in
which the agent facing the decision is not an individual,
but rather a corporate agent, such as a company or a country.
Should multinational corporations have continued their
financial dealings with South Africa during apartheid?
What sort of economic or military aid should the United
States give countries known to be guilty of human rights
abuses today? In addition, some complicity problems
involve individual or corporate agents who must discern
not whether to contribute to another agent’s wrongful act,
but instead whether to make use of its fruits. Should a single
mother struggling to support her family purchase inexpensive
Professor Kaveny delivered this talk on April 9, 2003, at a
Wednesday Lunch in Swift Common Room.
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Once you have turned your attention to the problem of complicity, it is 
hard not to notice examples of it in nearly every realm of human life.
clothing at a discount store if that clothing was made 
by children in sweatshops on the other side of the world?
Was the psychiatrist right in refusing to take payment for
treating Carmella Soprano because it would be taking
“blood money” gained from her husband Tony’s activities
in organized crime?
THE GAPS IN MORAL CARTOGRAPHY
Once you have turned your attention to the problem ofcomplicity, it is hard not to notice examples of it in
nearly every realm of human life. Nonetheless, contemporary
moralists, both religious and secular, are just beginning to
give it the sustained theoretical attention it deserves. The
quickest way to conjure my sense of the lacuna in the nor-
mative conversation today is by analogizing it to the MapQuest
program on the Internet. The scope of MapQuest can range
from the minuscule, focusing on only a few blocks, to the
nearly limitless, highlighting the main arteries that transverse
the continent. Much contemporary scholarship on ethical
matters is clustered at either end of the spectrum. Not much
attention has been given to the middle ground.
In the realm of “social theory,” on the one hand, the ethical
MapQuest gauge is set very broadly. By social theory, I mean
the many important discussions in theology, philosophy, and
political theory that have analyzed the various structures and
systems of human oppression. Marxist, feminist, and other
types of liberationist theories expose and critique the dense
relationship between highly flawed normative visions of
human nature and human flourishing, the institutions that
embody and propagate them, the “false consciousness” they
generate, and the patterns of economic and social injustice
they produce. The focus here is on “big picture” systemic
analysis. But what should be done about the deep social
problems they expose, and who should do what about
them? Leaving aside nation states, powerful political parties,
and large multinational corporations, it is not clear what
any single individual or garden-variety corporate agent can
or should do about the injustices exposed by such analyses. 
There is, of course, always the possibility of joining a
base community, or another community of resistance. But
such communities rarely have a direct and substantial effect
on the problem, unless the challenges of collective action
are overcome. Moreover, it is unlikely that everyone who
can join such a community is under a moral obligation to
do so. What should be the criteria used by someone 
discerning whether or not to join? Here, our ethical Map-
Quest gauge begins to constrict noticeably, but not so the
“social theory” discussion. 
At the other end of the spectrum falls what I will call
“moral theory,” where the MapQuest gauge can be wound
very tightly. One large segment of contemporary moral theory,
both theological and philosophical, focuses on the question
of how to evaluate the action of a particular moral agent.
The basic theories are introduced to students in most first-
year ethics courses: utilitarianism and other forms of con-
sequentialism, Kantianism and other deontological approaches,
rights-based approaches (which in my view incorporate
consequentialist and deontological elements), and virtue
theory. Moralists making implicit or explicit use of these
theories devote much attention to considering what sorts of
purposes agents may legitimately pursue, and/or what sorts
of results they may knowingly cause. The range of agents
considered is fairly broad. With respect to individual agents,
moralists have asked such questions as when, if ever, it is
permissible to end another person’s life by euthanasia. With
respect to corporate agents, they have considered such issues
as whether it is legitimate for a corporation to close a less
profitable or unprofitable plant that is of great economic
importance to the community in which it is located. With
respect to national agents, they have paid much theoretical
and practical attention to the conditions under which it is
just for one nation to wage war against another.
Needless to say, the discussion of all these issues is com-
plex and difficult. The context of the action in question,
its purpose, its foreseeable immediate and remote effects,
the distribution of the harmful effects, and what would
count as proper authorization in light of these effects are
all crucial and interrelated issues that arise in evaluating
any morally controversial topic. Boiled down to its essence,
however, the schema of the moral problem presented is
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fairly straightforward: Is it morally permissible for one
agent, whose moral agency is in some sense considered in
the abstract, to engage in the action or course of action
under discussion? Despite the range of problems and of
moral agents under discussion, our ethical MapQuest is very
narrow in its scope.
In concentrating on the question of complicity, I hope to
outline a moral cartography at an intermediate level of
detail. I have decided to begin by working from the tightest
setting and expanding the focus, attempting to look at a set
of issues that might be grouped together under the heading
“interactional morality.” These issues are important because
they point to a facet of human experience that is sometimes
masked by American society’s emphasis on self-reliance and
individuality: no one is an island; no one makes it alone; no
one goes through life without affecting the course of someone
else’s life. All of our actions both build on and contribute to
the actions of other people. 
This sort of interdependence of agents and their actions
has always been the case, of course. But in my view, certain
features of the contemporary world are prompting us to pay
critical attention to the way our actions interact with those
of other people, known and unknown. First, a higher degree
of interdependence characterizes our lives, especially for
those of us who live in developed countries. We need the
work of a wide variety of other persons for our food, clothing,
and shelter. Second, the production chain is characterized
by a great degree of anonymity. We do not know the people
and institutions that are contributing to making and dis-
tributing the necessities and accessories that support our
lives. Third, we are acutely conscious of a great deal of
moral pluralism in our interdependent world. It is not only
that some people have decided not to live by the tenets that
they (and we) espouse, it is also the case that they have
deep commitments to value systems that we believe to be
unjust or dehumanizing. We are anonymously dependent
in a deeply divided world.
Finally, I think it is fair to say that our age is characterized
by an increased sense of moral responsibility. The reasons
for this are complex and no doubt interrelated. I will mention
only one here: In significant ways, many of us no longer
think of ourselves as limited in our responsibility by the
specific roles that we play in our public and private spheres
of life (although we frequently think of ourselves as being
burdened with additional responsibilities because of those
roles). We are all potential Norma Raes or Karen Silk-
woods. To some degree, this development is a by-product of
our democratic social structure. But it is also a fruit of the
war-crimes trials after the end of the Second World War. “I
was just following orders” or “I was just doing my job” no
longer count as sufficient answers to the charge that one
knowingly performed an evil action, or, as is increasingly the
case, an action that one knew would significantly contribute
to the evildoing of another. 
RESOURCES AND QUESTIONS
So what sources can we draw upon to help us understandthe problem of complicity in the wrongdoing of others?
An interdisciplinary approach is essential. Resources in lit-
erature, particularly that dealing with the horrors of the Nazi
regime, are invaluable. In very different ways, both Sophie’s
Choice and Christa Wolf ’s Patterns of Childhood heighten
our awareness of the pervasiveness of complicity, and the
painful difficulties involved in recognizing it, not to mention
avoiding it, in societies permeated with gross injustice. 
Historical examples are also important. The practice of
usury, defined as lending money at interest, was prohibited
by the Catholic Church for centuries. A set of norms devel-
oped that regulated how intimately one could legitimately
be involved with the practice, and the circumstances under
which one could benefit from its fruits. 
Legal sources are also key: conspiring to commit a crime
and serving as an accessory to a crime are themselves crim-
inal activities. The relevant case law and provisions of the
penal code are worth mining for moral reflection, because
the criminal law frequently reflects the bedrock moral com-
mitments of a community. 
Finally, the work of religious thinkers can be helpful. For
example, the question of complicity has been treated in pain-
staking detail by the “manuals” of moral theology, composed
We are all potential Norma Raes or Karen Silkwoods.
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Formal cooperation takes place when the cooperator intends in her action 
to further the wrongdoing of the principal agent.
by Roman Catholic priest-moralists between the time of
the Council of Trent and the Second Vatican Council.
Because the manualists wrote primarily in order to guide
priests hearing confessions in determining whether, and to
what degree, the action confessed by a penitent was sinful,
they were forced to take seriously nitty-gritty moral problems
arising in day-to-day life. 
What, exactly, is the matter with complicity? How
should we evaluate it, drawing distinctions among its many
forms? In many of the more analytical resources I have
encountered, particularly the Roman Catholic manualist
tradition and the Anglo-American legal tradition, the second
question has received far more attention than the first. This
is not surprising, since both give a prominent place to case-
based, analogical reasoning. Consequently, the need to give
consideration to fundamental principles is less pressing than
in more systematic accounts of problems and issues. 
But, given the goals of my project, I do not have the
same luxury. I need to deal with the first question, “What is
the matter with complicity?” in order to give a comprehensive
account of the issue that hooks up in appropriate places with
the narrow and broad moral MapQuest discussions already
in place. But that does not mean I can leave the second
question entirely to one side; there is a dialectical relationship
between the two. The plausibility of my theoretical account
of the moral issues involved in complicity will depend in large
part on its ability to account for—or persuasively discount—
the ways in which particular cases of complicity do or do
not seem morally problematic. Rawls’s norm of “reflective
equilibrium” is a powerful way to call ourselves to account
in the realm of applied ethics, as well as in the context of
political philosophy.
In the remainder of this essay, I would like to do two
things. First, I would like to outline briefly the different
approaches taken by the moral manualists and the criminal
law to the question of how to evaluate cases of complicity.
Their concrete judgments will constitute one pole of the
reflective equilibrium. Second, I will sketch a few theoretical
possibilities for accounting for the problem of complicity—
for constituting the other pole of the reflective equilibrium.
I will suggest that two of these are inadequate, and one
holds some promise for future investigation. 
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC MANUALISTS
The manualists tended to concentrate on one aspect ofthe problem of complicity: cooperation with evil,
which refers to those situations in which the cooperator’s
action would contribute to (rather than benefit from) the
wrongdoing of another agent (frequently called the “prin-
cipal agent”). In other words, its focus was forward-looking,
calling the cooperator to reflect upon how his or her action
would interact with the actions of other persons. At first
glance, the scholastic categories used by the manualists to
parse the problem of cooperation can seem too arcane to
be useful in the contemporary world. In my view, however,
that superficial impression is mistaken. The manualists took
seriously the complexity of cooperation cases; the framework
they developed is best viewed not as a “computer program,”
designed to spit out answers to complex moral problems,
but rather as a guide to deeper moral discernment. What
are the components of that framework? 
The most important question is whether the cooperation
is formal or material. Formal cooperation takes place when
the cooperator intends in her action to further the wrong-
doing of the principal agent. The manualists considered
formal cooperation always to be wrong, because it is never
permissible intentionally to perform a morally evil act, even
for a good end. A clear example of formal cooperation,
according to the rationale of the manualists, is an intern
who cooperates in an abortion procedure in order to receive
a necessary medical certification. 
This judgment of complicity obviously depends upon a
prior judgment about the morality of abortion that is not
universally shared today. Deeper reflection on the example
demonstrates that the questions of pluralism and moral dis-
agreement are likely to be quite acute in complicity problems.
First, the very existence of a complicity problem depends
upon the judgment that the act of the principal agent is
morally wrong. For example, the intern will not see herself
as facing a cooperation problem if she does not believe that
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abortion is always morally wrong, or at least morally wrong
in this particular case. 
Second, the fact of deep and principled moral disagree-
ment means that potential cooperators must consider what
weight, if any, should be given to the fact that the principal
agent may not understand herself as doing anything morally
wrong. For example, the intern who does believe abortion
to be morally wrong is likely to be confronted with the 
fact that both the doctor
performing the procedure
and the woman who
obtains it take a different
moral view of the matter. 
It would be safe to say that
the questions surrounding
moral disagreement did not
preoccupy the manualists,
who assumed the existence
of an objective moral real-
ity upon which there was a
substantial consensus. But
today, these issues are nei-
ther easy nor rare; think
also of a request to partici-
pate in the surgical circumcision of a baby girl, or dangerous
and medically unnecessary cosmetic surgery. 
Material cooperation is defined negatively: all cooperation
that is not formal cooperation is by definition material cooper-
ation. In other words, in a case of material cooperation, the
cooperator foresees, but does not intend, that her action
contributes to the wrongful action of another. Stepping
back now from their technical scholastic vocabulary, we
can say that the framework developed by the manualists for
evaluating material cooperation is five-dimensional in
nature. Taking the perspective of a third-party observer, it
looks at the overlap, in the matrix of space, time, and
causality, between the act of the cooperator and the wrongful
act of the principal agent. All things being equal, the greater
the overlap between the two, the harder the act of cooperation
is to justify. 
At one end of the spectrum, cases of cooperation where
the overlap is virtually complete (which the manualists
called immediate material cooperation) were generally held to
be impermissible except in cases of duress. The reasons for
this judgment are not entirely clear. No doubt, one reason
is that the manualists saw themselves as facilitating the
work of confessors, who were charged with judging the
nature and degree of a sinner’s wrongdoing. In most cases,
it would be hard for an
objective third party to
believe a penitent’s claim
that she did not intend the
wrongdoing in which she
cooperated so intimately 
if there were no external
force coercing her will.
Consider, for example, the
Patty Hearst case. Viewed
from the perspective of an
external observer, it looked
like Hearst was intention-
ally facilitating the bank
heist orchestrated by the
Symbionese Liberation Army.
In fact, it would be very difficult for an objective third party
to believe otherwise, absent a compelling case of duress.
At the other end of the spectrum, cooperation entailing
little overlap or intimacy between the act of the potential
cooperator and the wrongful act of the primary agent was
viewed by the manualists as easier to justify, all else being
equal. This sort of case (which the manualists called remote
mediate material cooperation) would be permissible given a
sufficiently important reason. For example, consider a phar-
maceutical company that manufactures a drug that will be
helpful to many people, knowing, however, that some people
will abuse it. 
As these examples suggest, the matrix of overlap and
intimacy is not the only factor in the manualists’ evaluation
of cooperation cases. Other factors include whether the
wrongful act would occur without the act of cooperation
. . . in a case of material cooperation, the cooperator foresees, but does not intend, 
that her action contributes to the wrongful action of another.
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Under the common law, it is the agreement itself that constitutes the crime . . .
(i.e., “but for” causality), the gravity of the evil involved
(including whether it would harm innocent third parties),
and the gain that the cooperator hoped to realize (or the
loss that the cooperator hoped to avert). Another influential
factor is the potential of the cooperator to cause scandal by
her act of cooperation. In this context, the term “scandal” refers
not to the hushed whispers and veiled looks of community
busybodies, but instead to the potential for misleading 
others to believe that the principal agent’s wrongful act was
morally acceptable. 
Unfortunately, the manualists’ enthusiasm for categorizing
an almost endless variety of cooperation problems was not
matched by a similar concern to explain precisely why they
were morally problematic, or to demonstrate how the matrix
they developed appropriately sorted cases according to their
moral seriousness. In my view, this lacuna in their analysis
was an almost inevitable drawback of the genre in which
they were writing. The strength of the moral manuals was
that they took seriously the details of the moral problems
faced in ordinary life. Their weakness was that they fre-
quently failed to transcend those details. They were, after
all, manuals, written for fellow priest-confessors who were
assumed to be of one mind about the nature and purpose of
the Christian life. I sometimes think that their authors
would have responded to a request for broader reflection
with much the same bemusement that the technical writers
of an operator’s manual for a new car would respond to a
request to justify the importance of having a car in good
working order. From their perspective, the request would
simply fall beyond the purview of their project.
THE CRIMINAL LAW
The criminal law generally prohibits behavior that societybelieves is detrimental to the common good—behavior
that either attacks the good of one of the members of the
community (e.g., criminal assault), or undermines the con-
ditions necessary for the just and orderly pursuit of common
aims (e.g., insider trading). Two areas of the criminal law deal
extensively with complicity problems: the law of criminal
conspiracy and the law pertaining to accomplice liability.1
A criminal conspiracy is defined by common law as “an
agreement by two or more persons to commit a criminal act
or a series of criminal acts, or to accomplish a legal act by
unlawful means.”2 The law of accomplice liability identifies
“the circumstances under which a person who does not per-
sonally commit a proscribed harm may be held accountable
for the conduct of another person with whom he has asso-
ciated himself.”3 Being indicted for either crime is no small
matter, because the elements of the crime are vague and
the penalties for someone found guilty can be extreme. 
For example, consider the crime of conspiracy. Under
the common law, it is the agreement itself that constitutes
the crime, although some states also now require an overt
act in furtherance of the agreement. Furthermore, the
agreement at stake is defined loosely. It does not even require
a “meeting of the minds,” to borrow a phrase sometimes
used to define an “agreement” under contract law. In fact,
it is possible to be in a single vast conspiracy with people
one does not even know. In United States v. Bruno, for
example, the conspiracy to import and distribute, sell, and
possess narcotics was found to include both retailers in New
York and retailers in Texas/Louisiana, although no com-
munication was proven between the two groups. From the
point of view of the hapless, low-level conspirator, such a
scenario is highly undesirable, because it means that jail
time can be racked up quickly. Under common law, the
basic rule is that, first, a conspirator is guilty of every offense
committed by every other conspirator in furtherance of the
unlawful agreement and, second, the crime of conspiracy
does not merge into the substantive offense the parties to
the conspiracy were planning to commit. A defendant,
therefore, can be found guilty of both conspiracy to commit a
crime and the crime itself. (The Model Penal Code eliminates
this “double counting.”) 
From a defendant’s point of view, being indicted for
accomplice liability is not much better. Here, the issue is
the crime of assisting someone else to commit a crime.
“Assistance,” like “agreement” in the context of conspiracy
law, is defined very broadly. It encompasses “aiding, abetting,
encouraging, soliciting, and procuring the commission of
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the offense.” Moreover, an act of assistance does not need
to be particularly helpful in order to qualify. “Any aid, no
matter how trivial, suffices.”4 Applauding someone’s criminal
activities, or being a supportive presence at a crime scene in a
way that encourages the principal agent, can count as sufficient
assistance to make one an accomplice. Furthermore, as with
conspiracy, liability has a way of ballooning for someone
found guilty of being an accessory to a crime. A secondary
party or an accessory is
accountable for the con-
duct of the primary party.
This accountability includes
not merely the crime itself,
but also the natural and
probable consequences of
the crime. For example, if
you encourage me to rob a
bank, and in the course of
doing so I intentionally kill
a guard, you are liable as an
accessory to the crime of
murder, even though you
did not encourage me to
commit that crime and 
you did not contemplate that anyone would die during 
the caper.
What mental state is required of the defendant charged
with conspiracy or liability as an accomplice to a crime? A
key issue here is whether “purpose” is the required mental
state, and whether, or when, mere “knowledge” that one’s
action will contribute to a conspiracy or provide assistance
in a crime is sufficient. The “purpose” requirement is akin to
formal cooperation. If you join a conspiracy purposefully
agreeing to further its criminal goals, or if you provide assis-
tance to the primary party of a crime with the intention of
furthering that crime, well, too bad for you. Most people
would say that you joined your mind and will to the crim-
inal endeavor and deserve whatever punishment you get
(provided, of course, that it meets other requirements of
fairness and moderation).
The more interesting question is whether proof of mere
knowledge that your action will further a crime ought to
suffice for criminal liability. This realm is analogous to what
the manualists would consider material cooperation. Sup-
pose, for example, you rent your house to someone who you
know is running an illegal gambling operation there. Are you
an accomplice? Are you in a conspiracy? Suppose that some-
one comes into your sporting goods shop, buys a hunting
rifle, and casually mentions
that he will be using it to
kill his wife. What result
then? Suppose he just says
that he is looking forward
to freedom from that “old
ball and chain”? In the
context of the conversa-
tion, you are pretty sure
that he meant his wife,
although he did not say 
so explicitly. What should
happen to you if you do
nothing and she is mur-
dered one week later, or
one month later, or one
year later? Where is the line between doing your job while
minding your own business, on the one hand, and culpable
indifference to the plight of other individuals, or to the welfare
of the community as a whole, on the other? 
Two federal cases, both of which were eventually heard
by the Supreme Court, set the legal context for much
American reflection on the matter. In United States v. Fal-
cone, the suppliers of sugar and other lawful materials to those
operating an illegal still were indicted, tried, and convicted
of conspiracy. Their convictions were reversed on appeal. 
In Direct Sales Co. v. United States, the defendant, a drug
wholesaler, sold large quantities of legal drugs to one par-
ticular physician, who was illegally reselling them. In this
case, the defendant’s conviction was upheld. The Supreme
Court distinguished it from Falcone on the grounds that the
goods supplied in that case were items of free commerce,
Suppose, for example, you rent your house to someone who you know is 
running an illegal gambling operation there. Are you an accomplice?
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. . . the intermingling of agency . . . is precisely what renders 
complicity uniquely morally problematic.
while those in Direct Sales were commodities whose sale
was restricted by law. 
Finally, one case from the state of California has garnered
some attention. In People v. Lauria, the operator of a tele-
phone message service was indicted for conspiracy on the
basis of the fact that he took messages for known prostitutes.
Affirming an order setting aside the indictment, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal identified a number of factors that
could affect the outcome in a particular case: whether the
purveyor of legal goods for illegal use has a stake in the ven-
ture, whether there is a legitimate use for the goods or services,
and whether the volume of business with the buyer is grossly
disproportionate to any legitimate demand. Finally, the
court also indicated that the nature of the criminal act is also
at issue: facilitating prostitution is one thing, facilitating
murder is quite another.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE 
PROBLEM OF COMPLICITY
The relevant materials from sources as diverse as moraltheology, literature, and law make it clear that some-
thing is the matter with complicity in the wrongdoing of
another. But what is it? What normative account of the
moral life makes sense of the problem? This is an extremely
difficult and complicated question, and I can only provide
the roughest guide to my thinking on this matter here. 
Can a pure consequentialist approach account for the
problem of complicity, including the factors that have been
considered relevant by those charged with dealing with it
in concrete cases either as a sin or as a crime? In my view,
probably not, for two reasons. First, both the manualists and
the criminal law give significant weight to the complicit
party’s intention or purpose in performing the action that
facilitates the wrongdoing of another. This weight would
be difficult to account for in a consequentialist theory, the
major concern of which would not be the agent’s purpose in
acting, but the consequences she foresaw resulting from that
action. This is not to say, of course, that foreseen conse-
quences are irrelevant from the perspective either of the
moral manualists or the criminal law. As we saw above, this
is very far from the case. Nonetheless, factors other than
the causal nexus between the complicit agent’s action and
the wrongful act of the primary agent enter prominently
into both frameworks for analysis. Second, my general sense
is that a consequentialist approach would dissolve, rather
than solve, the problem of complicity, whose essence is the
connection between the complicit agent and the evildoing
primary agent. Ultimately, I doubt that a consequentialist
would be able to acknowledge the moral relevance of the fact
that my action does not cause certain harmful consequences
to come about directly, but only indirectly, by “running
through” the agency of another person. 
What about rights theory? Again, I will have to be cursory
in my assessment. It strikes me that a rights-based approach
would lead one to focus upon either the right of the complicit
agent to act, on the one hand, or upon the right of the victim
to be free of the harmful effects caused by the principal
agent, on the other. The first focus would view the act of the
wrongdoing primary agent as an intervening cause, relieving
the complicit agent of responsibility for the harm caused.
The second focus would emphasize the fact that the complicit
agent foresaw the harm to the victim’s rights, and deny the
relevance of the fact that the harm was caused primarily by
another party. From either vantage point, the fact that the
agency of the complicit party and the primary wrongdoer
are in some way intermingled in bringing about the harm at
issue would not be considered relevant, let alone important,
to the proper moral analysis of the situation.
Yet the intermingling of agency, and the intimacy with
wrongdoing that it entails for the complicit agent, is pre-
cisely what renders complicity uniquely morally problematic.
Consider, again, the novel Sophie’s Choice. The narrator
attempts to explain what was at stake for the concentration-
camp physician who invited Sophie to choose which of her
children would live and which would immediately be sent
to the gas chamber. Entering into the Nazi physician’s mind
in order to describe his motivations, the narrator speculates:
“Was it not supremely simple, then, to restore his belief in
God, and at the same time to affirm his human capacity for
evil, by committing the most intolerable sin that he was
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able to conceive? Goodness could come later. But first a
great sin. One whose glory lay in its subtle magnanimity—
a choice.”5
What was this new “intolerable sin”? Clearly, it was not
violating the rights of the child who was murdered in the
gas chamber—he had already committed that intolerable
sin many times over. Rather, it was conscripting Sophie’s
will in the murder of her own child. The novel chronicles
Sophie’s inability to deal
not only with the material
consequences of her
choice, but also with its
moral consequences for her
own character. Did she
betray her obligations as a
mother? Sophie reflects,
“In some way I know I
should feel no badness 
over something I done like
that. I see that it was
—oh, you know—beyond
my control, but it is still so
terrible to wake up these
many mornings with a
memory of that, having to live with it.” 6 The “subtle 
magnanimity” of the choice lay precisely in its appeal to 
consequentialist reasoning: why let two children die when
you can save one? The “sin” was in the deliberate decep-
tiveness of the choice; its attempt to equate acting to 
ameliorate a natural threat with acting complicitously with
a human one, even for a good end. But Sophie’s anguish, 
I think, is not the same as that which she would have 
suffered had she simply chosen which child to save from 
a burning building. 
My hunch is that virtue theory is the approach most
likely to account for Sophie’s anguish, as well as the concerns
of the manualists, and even a significant portion of the
criminal law. The fundamental problem raised by cooperation
with evil is what it does to the agent herself when she
knows that in some sense her will is to be taken up into and
incorporated by the will of a wrongdoer. How close to evil
can one get without being contaminated by it? What does
it mean to be tainted by evil? What are the implications
for the agent, for her future actions, and for the society in
which she lives? In my view, these questions can only begin
to be addressed with an approach that holds together reflec-
tions upon the act, the acting agent, and the normative
vision of the community in which the agent’s actions 
are intelligible. 
So I have no ending to
this essay, only the begin-
nings for my book. I have
begun to reread classical,
medieval, and contempo-
rary virtue theory, turning
to Aristotle, Aquinas,
MacIntyre, and Nussbaum
with a very different set of
questions than the ones 
I had when I read them 
in graduate school. What
has been wonderful to ex-
perience, during this year
at the Divinity School, has
been the joy and excitement of addressing a new set of
pressing questions to texts of enduring value. ❑
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